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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
US$1.00 - Hwan 1,300
Hwan 1.00 - US$0.00077
Hwan 1 million US$770.00
The unit of currency was recently
changed to Won, which is equal to
10 old Hwan. Throughout this
report, figures are expressed in
the old Hwan.
Fiscal Year
January 1 to December 31
Totals may not add because of
rounding.
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APPRAISAL OF THE 1962-1966 INVESTMENT PROGAM
OF THE KOREAN NATIONAL RAILROAD
Summary
i) The Government of Korea has asked IDA for a credit to finance a
significant part of the Korean National Railroadts 1962-1966 Investment
Program. The borrower would be the Government of Korea.
ii) IDA believes that the priorities of the Korean railroad require
that IDA finance (a) 800 coal cars, (b) 75 third-class and 40 second-class
passenger cars, and (c) US$100,000 for financial consultants. The total
credit would be US$140. miUion equivalent.
iii) The Korean National Railroad is State-owned. It does not exist
as a separate legal entity, nor does it have its own independent management,
but is an integral part of the Ministry of Transportation. The Ministry
has substantial authority in the operation of the Railroad, but must secure
the approval of the Supreme Council of National Reconstruction on such
matters as general rate and fare increases, wage and salary increases, major
reorganizations, and the annual budget.
iv) In spite of some organizational deficiencies, the management and
operation of the Railroad is satisfactory. Employees are generally selected
by competitive examination, and bureau chiefs are chosen from among out-
standing employees.
v) The property of the Railroad was heavily damaged in the Korean war,
but has been substantially rehabilitated. The only significant exception
is passenger cars. Maintenance is generally good.
vi) Freight traffic increased from 10.4 million tons in 1955 to 15.4
million tons in 1961, or about 7 percent annually. During this period the
number of passengers grew from 57.3 million to 88.3 million, or about 8
percent per year. These increases compare to an annual population growth
of about 2.5 percent, and an increase in gross national product of h.5 per-
cent. By far the most important commodity carried is coal, which in 1961
accounted for 46 percent of the commercial revenue freight. The railroad
traffic is not now or in the foreseeable future subject to significant
highway or shipping competition.
vii) The Railroadts operating efficiency is very good, has been improv-
ing continuously, and compares favorably with that of other railroads in
East Asia.
viii) The Railroad does not have cost accounting, balance sheet. profilt Mnd
loss and other financial statements, so that a definitive conclusion con-
cerning its financial position is impossible. It would appear however, thit,
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while its position is not now satisfactory, it can be made sound by raising
unduly low rates and fares and by a policy of offsetting wage and price in-
creases promptly by rate and fare increases. The Railroad is now beginning
to establish a modern accounting and statistical system, but needs assistance
for this purpose.
ix) The Railroad's 1962-1966 Program, designed to increase capacity
and improve efficiency, is estimated to cost (without an allowance for con-
tingencies) Hw 215.5 billion (USpl65.8 million equivalent), including UST80.7
million in foreign exchange. While the Program is reasonably balanced it
exceeds available funds by at least Hw 75 billion (if an allowance is made
for contingencies), and would require more than US$p50 million in foreign ex-
change above the amount now in sight. In addition, the Association believes
that the Railroad's traffic forecast is too high and that some parts of the
Program do not appear justified at this time, and therefore recommends post-
ponement of some parts of the Program beyond 1966. The cost of the revised
Program, including contingencies would be Hw 194.0 billion (US$S149.2 million
equivalent), including USV59.8 million in foreign exchange. Making equiv-
alent allowances for contingencies, the revised program involves a reduction
of about 20 percent from the Government's program, with foreign exchange
requirements reduced by nearly 30 percent.
x) To finance the foreign exchange costs of the revised Progrm ofU$59.8
million, the Government has already committed US`3.5 million out of its own
foreign exchange resources and has a reasonable anticipation at this time
of receiving US$31.0 million from AID and IDA. To obtain the remaining
US`',25.3 million during the next 41 years should not present unreasonable
difficulties, especially since US,17.7 million will not be needed until after
1963.
xi) The cost of the revised Program, plus loan repayments in 1962-1966,
will total Hw 202.0 billion. To finance this, the Railroad can expect to
obtain Hw 71.8 billion internally, Hw 40.3 billion from foreign loans now
under consideration, and Hw 50.7 billion from the General Account, or a total
of Hw 162.8 billion. To finance the deficit of Hw 39.2 billion, and to per-
mit an increase in working capital, the Government has agreed to raise freight
rates in 1963 and the Railroad will require loans of about Hw 16.0 billion
in 1962 and H1W 4.0 billion in 1963 if the Program is not to be delayed.
xii) The Project is that part of the revised 1962-1966 Railroad Program
which involves (a) procurement and manufacture of rolling stock during 1962
and 1963; (b) completion of the Hwanji line in 1963; and (c) establishment
of a modern accounting and statistical system. Its total cost will be Hw
35.3 billion (US$,15.9 million equivalent) and it accounts for about 27 per-
cent of the foreign exchange cost of the whole Program and 18 percent of the
local expenditures. All procurement under the IDA credit will be on the
basis of international competitive bidding.
xiii) The Project is technically sound and of high priority for the eco-
nomic development of Korea. It is suitable for an IDA credit of US:,l1.0
million. To help assure its financial and economic success, the Government
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has agreed to a number of conditions, such as the appointment of a railroad
manager; making the Railroad a separate agency; an early increase in freight
rates and further rate or fare increases as needed to offset wage and other
cost increases; and consulting IDA before undertaking certain parts of the
Investment Program having a lower priority.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Government of Korea has asked IDA for a credit to finance a
significant part of the Korean National Railroad's 1962-66 Investment
Program which includes rehabilitation, modernization and expansion to pro-
vide additional capacity mainly through the procurement of locomotives and
rolling stock, and to reduce operating costs primarily by dieselization.
The borrower would be the Government of Korea.
2. IDA believes that the priorities of the Korean railroad require
that IDA finance (a) 800 coal cars; (b) 75 third-class and 40 second-class
passenger cars which would cost about the same as the 100 second-class cars
applied for; and (c) US$100,000 for financial consultants. The total
credit would be US614.0 million equivalent.
3. This report assesses the technical, economic and financial aspects
of the Program, based on the findings of an IDA mission which visited Korea
in April 1962.
II. THE RAILROAD
A. Organization, Management and Labor
4. The Korean National Railroad is State-owned. It does not exist as
a separate legal entity, nor does it have its own independent management
headed by a railway manager, but is an integral part of the Ministry of Trans-
portation. The Government recently considered establishing the Railroad as a
separate body with its own management, but decided against this at least until
such time as its assets and liabilities are properly identified and evaluated.
The necessary inventory was recently started and is estimated to take about
two years.
5. The Ministry of Transportation is responsible for the operation of
the Railway; the inspection and licensing of trucks and the issuing of route
certificates for buses; the operation of airports and the regulation of civil
aviation; the regulation of commercial maritime operations; and the operation
of eight tourist hotels. The Ministry has eight central bureaus, plus a numbe2
of regional ones. Of the eight central bureaus four deal virtually exclusive]
with the Railway: the Land Transportation Bureau (traffic and operations), the
Engineering Bureau (civil engineering), the Machinery and Electricity Bureau
(mechanical engineering), and the Railroad Construction Bureau (new line con-
struction); two others - the Finance and Accounting Bureau and the Supply
Bureau - deal also with non-railway matters, though most of their work is for
the Railroad; the two remaining ones are the Marine Bureau and the Tourism,
Highway and Aviation Bureau. The bureaus are coordinated by a Planning Coordi.
nator, whose main function however is to coordinate the planning of the Min-
istry with that of the national Economic Development Board. The cooperation
of the bureaus is reasonably good, primarily because the staffs have worked
together for many years, but could be improved by the appointment of a Rail-
road manager to which the Government has agreed in the Credit Agreement. As
part of the Credit Agreement, the Government has agreed to establish before
June 30, 1963, a separate office in the Ministry of Transportation which will
be responsible only for the management and operation of the Railroad;,and the
Government has also agreed to make the Railroad a separate agency promptly after
the establishment of a sound accounting system.
6. The Ministry has substantial authority in the operation of the Rail-
road. Important areas in which it must secure the approval of the Supreme
Council of National Reconstruction are general rate and fare increases, wage
and salary increases, major reorganizations, and the annual budget, including
major investments.
7. The Railroad's staff is competent and generally makes a good impres-
sion. In general, the Railroad is well managed and there is no evidence of
deficiencies in the handling of traffic, operations, and engineering matters.
In the financial and economic area, however, the Railroad's practices are out-
of-date and require major improvements (see paragraph 42).
8. The Minister of Transport, the Vice Minister and the workshop managerE
are high army officers, but there are indications that the Government is re-
placing more and more army officers in civilian positions by civilians. The
Minister and Vice-Minister are appointed by the Prime Minister writh the approval
of the Chairman of the Supreme Council. Bureau chiefs are usually selected fron
outstanding employees who have advanced to the position of section chief. Em-
ployees are generally selected by competitive examination, and may become mem-
bers of a craft union. The tenure and status of officers and employees does not
differ from that of other Government employees.
9. As shown in detail in Table No. 1, the number of employees has de-
clined in recent years from 31,092 in 1956. to 26,316 by the end of 1961. At
the same time, productivity has been going up, the number of traffic units
handled per employee increasing by nearly 50 percent from approximately 200,000
in 1956 to nearly 300,000 in 1961.
B. Property
10. The Korean National Railroad is the only railroad in Korea and covers
the country reasonably well. At the end of 1961 it operated 2,896 route-km of
standard gauge lines (418''i) and 126 km of narrow gauge lines (3'). The main-
line from Seoul to Pusan (470 km) is double track; all other lines are single
track. There are many sections in the mountainous areas with steep gradients
up to 1 in 30.
11. The Railroad property, especially its rolling stock, suffered severel3
from inadequate maintenance during World War II and from heavy damage during the
Korean War. Most of the damaged properties have been rehabilitated since 1953,
but a few buildings, workshops and running sheds still show damage, and there
is still a lack of rolling stock. Since the end of the war in 1953, 270 km of
new lines have been constructed, mainly to connect coal mines and industrial
plants with the Railroad system.
12. The lines in the coal mining area in the northeast of Korea from
Tongni to Samchok and the port of Mukho are connected with the main system
of the Railroad only by a rope railway, which climbs 210 m over a distance
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of 1 km. The capacity of this ropc railway is limited to 600 net tons in
24 hours, since only one car with 15 net tons can be handled at a time. In
order to facilitate increased coal and cement shipments from the Samchok
area, an 8 km long rail detour is being constructed.
13. The total track length, including double tracks and sidings, is
4,h89 km standard gauge and 116 km narrow gauge. About 1,0h0 km of the
standard gauge tracks are laid with 50 kg rails and 2,600 km with 37 to 40 kg
rails. The narrow gauge tracks are mainly laid with 22 kg rails. About
10 percent of the 50 kg and 37 kg rails were laid or relaid since 1955; the
remainder is rore than 30 years old. Ballasting is good. The ties are of
treated wood, imported from abroad, and are generally in good condition. The
track is generally well maintained, and will be adequate for new and heavier
equipment.
1h. The signalling system is adequate, being color light in the Seoul
areaand on a part of the Seoul-Pusan line, and electric block instruments
on the southern section of the Seoul-Pusan line and on most of the single
track mainlines. The telecommunication system is satisfactory.
15. The damaged workshops are almost rebuilt and they are well equipped
with modern machinery. Since the Railroad is in the process of replacing
steam traction by dieselization, the workshops have ample space. It is there-
fore possible to increase their capacity for repairs or even for construction
of new rolling stock. The workshop at Inchon was a car factory before the
war, and is now again producing passenger cars at a rate of 5 to 6 per month.
Its capacity can be increased to meet most long-runneeds since only two-thirds
of its buildings have been rehabilitated so far.
16. Satisfactory maintenance facilities for diesel locomotives and
railcars exist at Pusan, Changyangni, Chaechon and Taejon. Not all of the
damage to the maintenance facilities for steam locomotives has been repaired
because the Railroad, hoping to eliminate steam traction by 196h, has post-
poned their complete rehabilitation.
17. War losses of freight cars have been almost made up as far as
numbers are concerned, but there is some obsolete stock due for scrapping
(see Table No. 2). The Railroad lost about 40 percent of its passenger cars
during the Korean War and the remainder was in bad condition at the end of
the war. To offset the losses, the Railroad purchased about 120 second-hand
passenger cars from American railroads and is still using 460 converted box
cars and even plain box cars for passenger transport. The serviceable stock
now consists of 9,230 freight cars and 1,260 passenger cars (of which 460 are
converted box cars of about half the seating capacity of standard passenger
cars), compared to about 11,400 freight cars and 1,250 passenger cars before
the Korean War.
18. The serviceable motive power consists of 179 coal burning and 100
oil burning steam locomotives, 95 diesel electric locomotives and 31 railcars,
compared with about 600 steam locomotives before the Korean War (see Table
No. 2). The fact that 100 steam locomotives have been converted for oil
burning even though Korea produces substantial amounts of anthracite is due
to the unsuitability of the local anthracite for burning in locomotives which
therefore has to be pressed into briquets with the use of imported coal tar
pitch.
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19. The maintenance of diesel locomotives, railcars and rolling stock
is good, but that of steam locomotives is kept to a minimum necessary to
keep them running until the completion of dieselization in a few years.
C. Traffic
20. Passenger traffic has contributed significantly more to the Rail-
road's gross revenues than freight traffic. The latter accounted for about
30 percent of revenues in 1957; this proportion had increased to 42 per-
cent by 1961, and is expected to reach 45 percent by 1966. In terms of
trains-kms, however, freight has accounted for nearly 60 percent of the
total in recent years.
Freight Traffic, 1955-1961
(Millions of Tons)
Year Commercial Military Railroad Total Total
Freight Freight Service Freight Net ton-kms
Freight (billions)
1955 5.0 4.0 1.4 10.4 2.1
1956 5.6 4.0 l.h 11.0 2.3
1957 7.0 3.7 1.3 12.0 2.6
1958 7.3 3.4 1.4 12.1 2.7
1959 9.0 3.2 1.5 13.8 3.1
1960 10.2 2.8 1.4 14.4 3.3
1961 11.1 2.9 1.4 15.4 3.5
Total freight tonnage has increased about 7 percent annually and
total ton-kms about 10 percent between 1955 and 1961 (for details see Table
No. 3). These increases compare with a growth in real gross national product
of about h.5 percent annually during this same period. The percentage increaseE
from 1959 to 1961 were considerably less than the average of the preceding
five years, reflecting the sharp drop in the growth of gross national product
in 1960 and 1961.
22. As shown in the above table, commercial revenue freight increased
from 5.0 million tons to 11.1 million tons between 1955 and 1961, or nearly
20 percent per year, with a substantially smaller growth since 1959. By far
the most important commodity carried is coal, which in 1961 accounted for
46 percert of the commercial revenue freight. Other major comrodities are
fertilizer (7.2 percent), cement (5.h percent), rice (4.5 percent), ore
(3.6 percent), and timber and petroleum (2.7 percent each). The most im-
portant change in the composition of the commercial revenue freight between
1955 and 1961 was the relative increase in coal from 27 to 46 percent. Rail-
road service freight has remained stable since 1955, with a decline in coal
offset by an increase in other service freight. Military freight has declined
substantially.
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23. The average haul of commercial revenue freight has increased from
213 km in 1955 to 242 km in 1961. However most of this increase took place
between 1955 and 1956; since 1958 the average haul has remained relatively
stable.
24. The traffic density has increased sharply from about 736,000 ton-
kms per km of line in 1955 to 1,2L5,000 ton-kms in 1961. This reflects the
rapid growth in ton-kms while the system increased only slightly from about
2,800 km to 3,022 km during this period.
25. Passenger Traffic, 1955-1961
Year Millions of Passengers
1955 57.3
1956 66.3
1957 53.L
1958 70.1
1959 71.5
1960 75.7
1961 88.3
Passenger traffic increased about 8 percent per year between 1955 and 1961
(for details see Table No. l). This compares to an annual population growth
of about 2.5 percent and to an increase in gross national product of about
L.5 percent. The above table shows that the annual traffic growth has
fluctuated widely. Nearly three-fourth of the traffic is accounted for by
3rd class passengers, and about one-fifth by students.
26. Average distances travelled by passengers have not changed sig-
nificantly in recent years. The traffic density, however, increased from
1.3 million passenger-kms per km of line in 1955 to nearly 1.8 million in
1961.
D. Competition
27. With a well developed railway system, and a limited system of
paved highways which would be difficult and costly to enlarge sufficiently
so that it would cover most of the country, neither railway passenger nor
freight traffic is now or in the foreseeable future subject to significant
competition from buses and trucks. The M4inistry of Transportation has full
authority to license trucks and issue route certificates for buses, and in
doing so takes into account the volume of existing and anticipated traffic
to avoid uneconomic competition. The number of buses licensed has remained
stable for the last six years, as has the total operating route. About half
the buses operate in the Seoul area; most of the remainder operate in rural
areas where there is no railway, and where they provide feeder service to
the railway. Because of the heavy foreign exchange cost of gasoline, the
Ministry has purposely restricted bus transportation primarily to areas
where railway service is inadequate. The 3rd class railway passenger fare
per km of Hw 5.2 is less than half the Hw 11.00 bus fare.
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28. The situation is very similar for trucks. The total number of
trucks licensed increased only slightly from 9,590 in 1957 to 10,1h9 in 1961;
in the latter year it was actually lower than in tho three preceding years.
Railroad freight rates per ton-km are still substantially lower than truck or
ship rates, even after 25 pencent. increase o%P Junc l. 1962:
Commodity Rail Truck Ship
(Hw per ton - km)
Coal, Ore, Cement 6.70 62.00 12.10
Fertilizer, Rice 6.70 62.00 14.52
Gasoline 1.10 62.00 29.o4
Imported Materials 14.10 62.00 1h.52
29. The highway system is relatively limited. The current Five-Year
Program calls for expenditures of Hw 37.6 billion, of which Hw 18.h is for
bridge construction, Hw h.3 billion for roads in coal mining areas to serve
as feeders to the railway, Hw 10.9 billion for highway paving, and only
Hw .0 billion for new highway construction. Coordination of highway and
railroad construction plans is the responsibility of the Planning and Coordi-
nation Committee, which consists of the planning coordinators of the various
ministries, under the Prime Minister.
30. Shipping is also under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Trans-
portation but there is virtually no river traffic since most rivers are not
navigable, and the cargo fleet for coastal traffic is relatively small. In
1961, coastal ships unloaded nearly one-half million tons.o¢ ctal., -which was
by far the largest item carried. A substantial part of this was carried from
the north-east coal fields to the Pusan region because of the railroad's in-
ability to carry larger amounts through the bottleneck at Tongni; completion
of the Tongni bypass in 1963 should divert significant amounts to the railroad.
The same is true to a lesser extent also of cement. A major reason for high-
er shipping rates is that the size of vessels is limited by the port facilities
which cannot be significantly improved at reasonable costs.
E. Operating Efficiency
31. The Railroad's operating efficiency is very good, has been improving
continuously (see Table No. 1), and compares favorably with that of other
railways in East Asia.
32. The average train speed for the express on the Seoul-Pusan line is
66.8 km per hour; that of a representative freight train 37.1 km per hour.
These samples indicate a good performance.
33. Average availability of diesel locomotives is 97 percent, of
passenger cars 96 percent, and of freight cars 95 percent; these are satis-
factory figures. That of steam locomotives is only 77 percent because the
Railroad is not making full use of its steam locomotives during the transition
to dieselization.
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34. The utilization of motive power is high. For diesels, the engine-
km per engine day in the fleet was h02 in 1961, an improsTement of about 8
percent over the previous year. The number of traffic units per motive power
unit in the fleet was 19.2 million in 1961, an increase of nearly 80 percent
since 1955.
35. The rolling stock is used very intensively. The average turn-
around time of freight cars decreased from 8.5 days in 1955 to ).6 days in 1961
The average load has fluctuated at a high level of about 28 to 29 tons per car.
And the net-ton-km per freight car in the fleet reached 370,000 in 1961, more
than double the 1955 level.
36. The utilization of passenger cars reflects considerable over-loading.
The number of passenger-km per passenger-car-km declined from about 60 in 1956
to about 48 in 1957, but has remained at this high level since. This rep-
resents a utilization of about 75 percent, iwhich is extremely high since in
most other countries a normal rate is L0 percent when allowance is made for the
uneven traffic along many lines and during the different hours of the day.
F. Rates and Fares
37. The Budget and Accounting Law of December 19, 1961 (Law No. 8h9)
provides that rates charged by government enterprises are to be set by the
Government after review by a public rate-making Committee consisting of the
Chairman of the Economic Planning Board (Chairman of Committee), the Ministers
of Finance, Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, Transportation, and Communica-
tion, and ten other qualified individuals. The Cormittee was established in
February 1962.
38. The freight rate structure is relatively simple, with three classes
of freight for carload and three for less-than-carload. The first class
includes such commodities as gasoline, textiles, machinery, chemicals, and
paint; the second fruits, fish, metallic manufactured goods and timber; and
the third rice, grains, fertilizer, cement and coal. Rates are not tapered
with increasing distance.
39. Freight rates were increased by 25 percent on June 1, 1962. The
previous increase took place on January 1, 1961, when carload rates for first
class goods were raised by nearly 73 percent, and those for second and third
class about 60 percent. In general, freight rate increases have more than
kept pace with price and cost increases (see paragraph 46). A judgment on
the absolute level of freight rates is not possible in the absence of cost
accounting. However, the fact that freight in 1961 accounted for only 42
percent of gross revenues but for nearly 60 percent of train-kms, as well as
the fact that the average revenue per ton-km of revenue freight in 1961 was
only about one-third of that of Burma and one-half of that of Thailand would
seem to give some indication that freight rates have been low. The 25 per-
cent increase of June 1, 1962, has remedied this situation to some extent.
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4o. There are three passenger classes. The fare for the third class is
one-half of the second class and one-fourth of the first class. Fares were
last raised on May 1, 1961, and are now 20 percent above the January 1, 1957
level. This compares with increases since.-1957 in the price index of producer
goods of 64 percent and in the operating expense per traffic unit of 44 per-
cent. The average revenue per passenger-km in 1961 was 5.9 Hwan (US¢O.54
per passenger-mile), or only about one-half of that of Burma and Thailand.
The Korean Government is not now contemplating passenger fare increases.
41. Since the Railroad does not have cost accounting, it is not possible
to compare rates and fares with respective costs. However, the indirect
evidence - the lag of passenger fare increases behind cost increases, the
comparison with other countries and with truck and bus rates, and the generally
unsatisfactory earning situation (see paragraph 45) - seems to indicate that rate
and fares are too low and could be raised without significant loss of traffic
to other modes of transport.
G. Finances and Earnings
42. Until January 1, 1962, the Railroad received its funds from the
Governmentts general budget, like other Government departments. To finance
certain special reconstruction costs, it received, in addition, funds from a
long-term loan by the Banc of Korea, with an interest rate of 2 percent. The
Railroad carries only single entry accounts for revenues and expenditures,
and has no capital accounts and balance sheets. Homever, the Budget and
Accounting Act for Government Enterprises (Law No. 928), December 31, 1961,
set up a Special Account for the Railroad. The Special Account will receive
all railroad revenues and will finance most railroad expenditures; some of
them - apparently those which the M4inistry of Transportation cannot justify
on commercial grounds but which the Government wants to make for other reasons -
will continue to be financed out of the General Account. The Act also requires
the establishment of a double-entry bookkeeping system with separate capital
accounts. This is now being started, but wrill take about two years to complete.
43. The Railroad has never prepared a balance sheet, but at the Associa-
tion's request made an estimate for December 31, 1961 (see Table No. 5), which
is summarized below:
Assets Liabilities
(Billions of Ihan)
Current Assets 18.5 Current Liabilities 2.1
Fixed Assets 570.4 Funded Debt 4.8
Capital 576.7
Retained Earnings 5.2
Total 588.9 588.9
44. It is doubtful whether this estimate has any real significance. Fixed
assets were calculated by adjusting the book value by a price index, and deduct-
ing an allowance for depreciation based on the expired life. No allowance was
made for obsolescence, nor was any actual inventory of fixed assets made. A
foreign technical advisor to the Railroad believes that fixed assets are over-
stated by perhaps 25 percent. (For a listing of the most important Balance
Sheet ratios see Table No. 5).
45. Since the Railroad does not have cost accounting but merely records
cash receipts and expenditures like other Government departments, it has not
prepared any profit and loss statements in the past. However, on the basis of
cash revenues and expenditures, plus an allowance for depreciation of one-
seventh of gross operating revenues, it would appear that the operating results
in recent years have not been satisfactory, with a net operating loss in all
but one year (for details, see Table No. 6):
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
(Billions of Hwan)
Operating Revenues 26.5 36.1 40.7 44.3 57.3
Operating Expenses
(including depreciation) 27.8 38.4 4o.o 45.5 58.2
Net Operating Revenues
(or Loss) (1.3) (2.3) 0.7 (1.2) (0.9)
Operating Ratio (%) 105 106 98 103 102
46. In the absence of cost accounting it is not possible to determine the
reasons for the poor operating results. It is striking, however, that in recent
years passenger fare increases have lagged continuously behind cost increases.
Passenger fares were not increased for 4-1/3 years after January 1, 1957, even
though during this period the prices for producersf goods increased by 47
percent and the operating expense per traffic unit by 43 percent. In comparison
to these increases, the May 1, 1961 passenger fare increase (and the minor
August 1961 downward adjustment) which raised most fares only 20 percent above
the 1957 level, was quite inadequate. This is also reflected in the fact that
the revenue per passenger-km increased only about 5 percent - from 5.6 to 5.9
Hwan - between 1957 and 1961 since the 1961 increase did not affect the first
four months of the year and did not apply to all passenger traffic. For freight,
the situation is substantially better, with carload rates about tripled between
1957 and 1961, less-than-carload rates about doubled, and a further increase of
25 percent put into effect on June 1, 1962. As a result of the 1958 and 1961
rate increases, the revenue per ton-km of revenue freight increased about 150
percent - from 2.8 to 7.0 Hwan - between 1957 and 1961. The increase in freight
revenues in this period was 265 percent compared to an increase in operating
expenditures of 109 percent, and made up for the lag in the increase of
passenger revenues of only 64 percent.
47. Debt service requirements have been low. Cash generated by the rail-
road in 1961 of Hw9.7 billion was 24 times the total debt service during that
year.
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48. As indicated above, the Railroad does not have a modern system of cost
accounting, which is now required by the Budget and Accounting Act for Govern-
ment Enterprises. The Railroad's management is conscious of the deficiencies in
the area and is giving attention to the matter, including training abroad. The
Credit Agreement specifically requires the maintenance of separate accounts for
the Railroad, adequate to reflect its receipts and expenditures and capital
transactions in accordance with generally accepted commercial accounting prac-
tices. However, the Railroad does not now have a sufficiently qualified staff
to set up a sound accounting and statistical system, and requires - and would
welcome - assistance in this field. Such assistance is intended as part of the
proposed credit, and an allowance of US$100,000 is made for this purpose. The
financial consultants should also review the desirability of an independent,
outside audit of the Railroad's financial statements.
III. THE 1962-1966 INVESTMENT PROGRAM
A. Main Outline
49. The 1962-1966 Railroad Investment Program is a part of the Five Year
Transportation Development Plan, which in turn is an important part of the
Government's overall Economic Development Plan. The Transportation Development
Plan includes only the areas of responsibility of the Ministry of Transporta-
tion, - the Railroad, Maritime transport, Aviation and Tourism; highway and
harbor construction are the responsibility of the Office of National Construc-
tion. All plans have been approved by the Economic Planning Board and the
Supreme Council of National Reconstruction.
50. The Railroad Program is designed to expand the railroad's capacity and
its network to meet a steadily growing traffic, and to improve operating effi-
ciency and decrease operating costs. The main items of the Railroad's Program
are:
a) New and improved lines: construction of 295 km of new lines (see
map), and double tracking and electrification of the Seoul-Inchon line (38.9 kmi
b) Motive power: procurement of 100 diesel electric locomotives and
145 diesel railcars.
c) Rolling stock: procurement of 185 passenger cars and of 1,055
coal hopper cars; local production of 400 passenger cars and 2,800 freight cars;
and remodeling of 825 freight cars.
d) Improved facilities: workshop buildings and equipment; track
improvements and additional sidings; improvement of marshalling yards; signal-
ling and communication facilities; and prestressed concrete ties and poles.
51. The cost of the Railroad Program is estimated by the Railroad at
Hw 215.5 billion (US$165.8 million equivalent) which does not include an
allowance for contingencies (see Table No. 7):
Local
Foreign Exchange Currency Total
$ Hw Billion Hw Hw Billion $ Million
Million Equivalent 'Tillion Equivalent Equivalent
New line construction 8.8 11.4 38.0 49.4 38.0
Seoul-Inchon double
tracking and
electrification 7.7 10.0 4.6 ib.6 11.2
Motive power and
rolling stock 53.0 68.9 36.3 105.2 80.9
Improvement of
Railroad facilities 11.2 1h.6 31.7 46.3 35.6
Total 80.7 lo4.9 110.6 215.5 165.7
52. This Program, although reasonably balanced physically, exceeds the
estimated available funds by at least Hw 75 billion if a reasonable allowance
is made for contingencies; the foreign exchange requirements would be more
than US$50 million above the amount now in sight (see Section C below).
Furthermore, since IDA believes that the traffic will be below the Railroadts
forecast (see paragraph 70) and the some parts of the Program do not appear
justified at this time, it recommends that the Program be reduced by post-
poning some parts of it beyond 1966. Accordingly, the Credit Agreement pro-
vides that the Government will review the Program and before undertaking any
railroad investment in the items listed in paragraph 53, will inform IDA and
give it a reasonable opportunity to comment.
53. The followring items of the Railroadts Program should be postponed
(see Table No. 8):
a) Completion of the Chinju-Sunchon line, though necessary to improve
transportation between Pusan and the south-western part of the country, could
be postponed until 1968. Only 50 percent of the Railroadts allocations are
therefore included in the revised Program recommended in paragraph 54 below.
b) Electrification of the Seoul-Inchon line for suburban traffic
should be postponed until a detailed study of the suburban traffic needs in
the Seoul area has been made. (Double tracking of the Yon Dong Po-Inchon
section appears justified and is included in the revised Program).
c) Procurement of 1h5 railcars should be postponed. The'traffic
estimated until 1966 can be moved with the existing 95 diesel locomotives and
30 railcars, together with the 100 additional locomotives to be procured.
d) Procurement of 85 passenger cars from abroad, including 24 cars
for fast luxury services between Seoul and Pusan, should be postponed.
Operation of fast non-stop services between Seoul and Pusan depends mainly
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on adequate motive power, which is included in the Program. The reduced
Program wouild still include the immediate procurement of 115 passenger cars,
to meet urgent requirements, but the balance of standard 2nd and 3rd class
cars can be manufactured locally at the very efficient Inchon workshop with
substantial savings of foreign exchange.
e) The local manufacture of 2,800 freight cars by 1966 should be
reduced to 1,800. The present need for coal cars will be met by the pro-
curement of 800 cars from the IDA credit; the procurement of 200 additional
coal cars is postponed until 1965. The further increase of the freight stock
capacity should be adjusted to the revised traffic forecast (see paragraph 69).
Stretching out the Program would also provide more stable employment at the
rolling stock factory, since the Government's Program would end in 1966.
f) The investment in workshop facilities at Inchon to increase the
production capacity for rolling stock should be extended over a longer period
in line with the recommendation in the preceding paragraph.
54. Taking into account the above reductions but adding an allowance for
contingencies of 5 percent for foreign exchange expenditures and of 15 percent
for local expenditures in 1962-64, and of 10 percent and 25 percent respective-
ly in 1965-66, the revised Program would cost Hw 194.0 billion (see Table No.8)
These estimates and contingencies are believed to be reasonable; however, they
make no allowzance for a sharp inflation, which, as explained in paragraph 63,
is assumed to be offset by rate and fare increases.
Local
Foreign Exchange Currency Total
Hw Billion Hw Hw Billion $ M5illion
Million Equivalent Billion Equivalent Equivalent
New line construction 7.6 9.9 32.2 42.1 32.4
Double tracking
Seoul-Inchon line 1.6 2.1 4.0 6.1 4.7
Motive power and
rolling stock 37.1 48.2 30.2 78.4 60.4
Improvement of Rail-
road facilities 10.0 13.0 31.5 44.5 34.3
Financial consultants 0.1 0.1 - 0.1 0.1
Total 56.4 7303 97.9 171.2 131.9
Contingencies 3.4 4.4 1804 22.8 17.5
Grand Total 59.8 77.7 116.3 194.0 149.4
55. This Revised Program is not directly comparable with the govern-
ment's Program since the latter did not include an allowance for contingencies.
If however the same percentage allowances were added to the government's Pro-
gram, the Revised Program wouild involve a reduction of nearly 20 percent with
foreign exchange requirements reduced by nearly 30 percent.
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B. Need
55. W7hile the Railroad was able to repair nearly all of its war damage,
it was not able to increase its capacity sufficiently to keep pace with the
growth in passenger and freight traffic since the end of the war. The
consequence ha.s been delays in transportation, uneconomic handling of freighs
and inconvenience for passengers in overcrowded trains. Since further traffic
increases are anticipated (see paragraphs 68 and 69), it is essential that these
deficiencies should be eliminated and capacity added for future traffic needs.
At the same time it is necessary to modernize operations in order to reduce
costs, and to construct new transportation facilities in the industrial areas
of the country.
56. The need for the individual items of the revised Program is as follows
a) New Line Construction
i) The Hwanji Line (Tongni-Simpori, 8 km) will connect the coal
mining area in the northeast with the main Railroad system by eliminating the
bottleneck from the existing rope railway. The other section of the Hwangji
Line (Hwanji - Baksan, 8 km) and the Chungsun Line (Hamback-Chungsun, 42 kin)
will provide transportation from newly developed coal fields. These lines are
urgently needed for the transport. of the expanding coal production, wihich is
essential for Korea's industrial development.
ii) The Kyungbuk Line (Yongji-Chomchon, 58.6 km) will connect
the northeast coal mining area with the center of the country and with the port
of Pusan and will increase the capacity of the Railroad system.
iii) The Tonghae Pukbu Line (Okkae-Kanguung-Sokcho, 92.9 km) will
provide transportation for the coal and ore mining area north of 1iukho and
help to develop the northern coastal area. Before 19h5 this area was
connected with the Railroad system which now belongs to North Korea. Having
lost this connection, a new line from the South is necessary.
iv) The Nungeui Line (Kahang-Yuijongbu, 5.4 km) will connect the
existing lines and will provide better transportation in the suburban..area
north of Seoul.
v) The Kyungjun Line (Chinju-Sunchon, 80.5 km of which 4O km is
included in the 1962-66 Program) will provide better transportation between
the port of Pusan and the southwest area of the country by eliminating the long
detour via Taejon; this will substantially decrease the turnaround time of
freight cars and speed up transportation.
b) Double Tracking of the Seoul-Inchon Line
The Seoul-Yongdongpo section (7 km) of this line already has
double track. Doubling the remaining 32 km to Inchon is needed for the
commuter traffic from new housing areas; these have been developed to
alleviate the over-crowded housing conditions in Seoul.
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c) Motive Power and Rolling Stock
i) 100 diesel electric locornotives are needed to replace the
268 serviceable standard gauge steam locomotives, of which however, only
170 to 190 are actually in use. This wotuld completely dieselize the Rail-
way's standard gauge system in the near future, and steam traction would
continue only on the 126 km narrow-gauge line with 8 looomotives; its
future has not yet been decided. The number and types of diesel locomotives
needed have been estimated by the Railway on the basis of the services ren-
dered by the steam locomotives to be replaced and a study of the future link-
ing of the services; these estimates appear reasonable. The greater avail-
ability of the 100 diesel locomotives will meet the increasing traffic de-
mand during the Program period (for details see Annex 1).
Of the three types of locomotives (i) 15 locomotives of 1,850
hp are to be used for the hauling of heavy freight trains on the mountain-
ous line from Seoul to Yongju and the Port of Miukho, which has gradients
up to 1:30; (ii) 25 locomotives of about 1,300 hp are to be used for haul-
ing trains from Seoul to Pusan; and (iii) 60 locomotives of about 875 hp
are to be used on the remaining main and branch lines and for shunting serv-
ices. The additional number and types of diesel locomotives will also make
it possible to release existing diesel locomotives for duties which they can
render most efficiently.
When further traffic increases after 1966 require additional
motive power, a study should be made whether to purchase railcars or loco-
motives. Railcars could be used to separate passenger and freight traffic
of mixed trains, thus speeding passenger services and making available
a number of existing locomotives for freight services.
ii) Procurement of 115 passenger cars (40 second class and 75
third class cars) is needed to replace obsolete stock, particularly con-
verted box cars now used for passenger traffic. The second-class cars
Xill release obsolete second-class cars for temporary use as third-class
cars. Additional third-class cars will be manufactured locally. (For
details see Annex 2).
iii) Procurement of 800 coal cars in 1962-63 and 200 in 1965 is
necessary to meet the demand for coal transport which wqill increase at a
rate of 600,000-800,000 tons per year even if allowance is made for the
decreasinr; use of coal by the Railroad with its forthcoming dieselization.
In addition, it will be necessary to manufacture a total of 800 coal cars
locally in 1963-66 and 400 annually thereafter to meet increasing traffic
demands and replace obsolete cars. (For details of the estimate see Annex
3 and 'Table No. 9).
iv) The local manufacture of 400 passenger cars and 1,800 freight
cars (including the 800 coal cars mentioned above) is necessary to meet
traffic demands in excess of those that can be met by imports. (A detailed
statement of the number of passenger and freight cars needed in 1962-66
and thereafter is presented in Annexes 2 and 3). The production of freight
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cars should start at a rate of 300 per year in 1963, increase to 700 cars
in 1966 and continue thereafter at an annual rate of 800 cars (400 coal
cars, 300 box cars and 100 other cars). Also as part of the Program, 500
wooden freight cars wrill be furnished aith steel bodies and 325 others
completely rebuilt to reduce uneconomic maintenance costs.
d) Improvement of Facilities
To facilitate local manufacture of rolling stock, and thus save
foreign exchange, it is necessary to rehabilitate some buildings in the
Inchon workshop and to purchase additional machine tools and equipment.
The workshop has ample space but not all war damage has been repaired.
The Program also provides for improvement of stations and marshalling yards,
communication and signalling facilities, power plants, and transshipment
facilities at the port of Mukho. Another major item of the Program is the
local production of 1.8 million pre-stressed concrete ties and 7,000 con-
crete telecommunications poles. Moulds and reinforcement steel and some
machinery wrill be imported, but cement and gravel will be produced locally.
Since there is very little timber in Korea, and since concrete ties and
poles last about twice as long as wooden ones, the use of concrete is very
economical.
C. Financial Aspects of Revised Program
58. The total estimated cost of the revised Five-Year Program which
is considered feasible and economically justifiable is Hw 194.0 billion.
To help finance the foreign exchange cost of US$59.8 million equivalent,
the Government has a reasonable anticipation at this time of receiving about
USI17 million from AID and USi14.0 million from IDA, or a total of US31.0
million. Out of its own foreign exchange resources, it has already committed
US4?3.5 million, so that additional foreign exchange of US$25.3 million will
have to be obtained during the next 4h years, primarily for the foreign
exchange costs of new line construction, improvement of facilities, and
procurement and local production of passenger and freight cars. This should
not present unreasonable difficulties, especially since U.S$17.7 million
will not be needed till after 1963; however, an additional US!V.7 million
will be required before then. If these additional funds are not obtained
in time, the Program would have to be stretched out somewhat, which, however,
would not seriously affect the parts for which funds are expected to be
available.
59. During 1962-66 period, the Railroad will have to make amort-
ization payments of Hw 1.4 billion on its existing loan to the Bank of Korea
and Hw 6.6 billion for funds to be obtained from AID and IDA. This
assumes that the Railroad Special Account would have to repay advances from
the IDA credit over a period of 25 years beginning in 1964 (as provided in
the Credit Agreement), and from the AID loan over 15 years, even though the
Korean Government will receive longer terms. These payments, plus the costs
of the revised Five-Year Program will total Hw 202.0 billion.
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60. The sources of the funds to finance this expenditure are summarized
below (for details see Table No. 10):
Railways Funds Hw billions
Net Income 15.4
Depreciation 56.4
Subtotal 71.8
General Account
(See para. h2 and Table No. 12) 50.7
Anticipated Loan Funds
IDA 18.2
AID 22.1
Subtotal 4o.3
Total Funds Available 162.8
The estimated availability of funds on this basis indicates a deficiency 
of
Hw 39.2 billion to finance the revised investment Program and the amortiza-
tion. To finance most of this deficit, the Korean Government has agreed 
to
an increase in freight rates of about 25,' as of June 1, 1963; to raise 
revenues
during the period by about Hht 31.5 billion.
61. In addition, however, Table No. 10 indicates that the Railroad will
be confronted wAitn an important financing problem already in 1962 with 
avail-
able funds about H1T 16.0 billion less than needed. This will require an early
loan by the Government to the Railroad. An additional loan of Hw 4.0 billion
will be needed in 1963. The funds that would become available from these
loans and the 1963 freight rate increase will also permit a necessary increase
in working capital.
62. The ability of the Railroad to provide from revenue the sum of
Hw 71.8 billion depends on the volume of traffic, the control of operating
expenses, and a rate and fare policy by which wage and other cost increases
are propptly offset by rate and fare increases. Past performance clearly
shows a steady growth of traffic (see Tables No. 3 and 4). The operating
ratio, however, has remained virtually stable with increases in producti-
vity offset by wage and price increases, which, in turn wrere not sufficiently
balancedby rate and fare increases to avoid losses in most years.
63. The estimate of net operating revenues for 1962 - 1966 is summarized
below (for details see Table No. 6):
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1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
(Billions of Hwan) -
Operating Revenues 68.2 74.6 79.3 83.8 88.8
Operating Expenses
(including depreciation) 71.7 7h.6 73.3 73.5 76.9
Net Operating Revenues (or Loss) ( 3.5 ) 0.0 6.0 10.3 11.9
Operating Ratio (%) '105 100 93 88 86
The estimate assumes that sharply increased productivity from dieselization
and other investments will limit the increase in operating expenses to about
7 percent between 1962 and 1966, even though operating revenues are estimated
to increase nearly 30 percent. This would permit a decline in the operating
ratio from 105 to 86 during this period. Since this favorable result will
not be achieved if the Government permits the increased productivity to be
nullified by inflation on the cost side without timely compensatory rate and
fare increaseq, the Government has agreed to offset all increases in present
wages or prices of supplies ind materials promptly by increases in rates or
fares.
64. The Railroad anticipates a more favorable financial position than
the one presented in this report. Firstly, it anticipates a greater increase
in freight traffic; this is discussed below in paragraph 70. In addition,
it envisaged that the exceptionally favorable terms of the AID and IDA
credits would accrue to it, rather than the Government in general. As a
result, it assumed that the Railroad will repay the IDA credit over 50 years
at 1 percent interest beginning in 1973 and the AID loan over 15 years at
3 percent interest beginning in 1962. Since the Railroad should be operated
on a more comimercial basis than indicated by these terms, - especially those
of the IDA credit, - IDA has assumed a 5-3/4 percent interest rate on these
loans and terms of 15 years for the AID loan and 25 years for the IDA credit.
The Government has agreed to these terms for the IDA credit.
65. The burden of debt service for the Railroad would be tolerable even
on the basis of the commercial terms suggested in the previous paragraph.
The maximum annual amount of interest payable would be Hw 3.5 billion in
1964. Amortization of principal would remain relatively stable at Hw 4.5
billion from 1964 on. The highest total debt service would be He 8.0 billion
in 1964. Times interest earned would increase to 4.0 by 1966, and the debt
service cover would increase from a low of 2.2 in 1964 to 3.3 by 1966 (see
Table No. 11).
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66. The above analysis makes it clear that even the revised Program will
require a major financial effort by the Railroad. The original Program which
would require nearly Hw 50 billion more (allowing for contingencies, which the
Program had not made), including an additional US$25 million in foreign ex-
change, does not therefore seem practical.
D. Economic Justification
67. The Bank's report on "The Economy of the Republic of Korea",
February 5, 1962 (Report No. FE-22) concluded that further improvement and
expansion of the railroad "are necessary for the efficient handling of a
greatly increased volume of traffic". It mentioned specifically that the
needed increase in coal production (see paragraph 71 below) depends on the
extension of the railway network and the expansion and modernization of the
freight car fleet. "Major investments in the railroad, in particular in
relation to the coal expansion program, appear to be of high priority,"
68o Considering the regions served by the Railroad, the commodities it
carries, and the passenger services it provides, the bulk of its traffic is of
a kind which can be provided more economically by rail transport than by other
means. The rail network is the only one which connects all parts of the
country with Seoul and Pusan, the two largest commercial centers. Natural
conditions severely limit river transport. The highway network is being
developed only slowly and most of it is unsuitable for heavy traffic or all-
weather service.
69. As far as railway passenger traffic is concerned, it would appear
conservative to assume an increase of about 7 percent annually between 1962
and 1966, compared with an increase of 8 percent from 1955 to 1961. This is
also generally consistent with the estimate of the Railroad.
70. As for railway freight tonnage, our estimate of growth during the
next five years is about 32 percent, compared with a h0 percent increase
during the last five years. The Railroad's estimate is very similar through
1964, but diverges substantially thereafter, with the Railroad assuming a
major spurt in coal production in 1965. In view of the great deal of explor-
atory work needed to achieve such a spurt, the difficult administrative problems
involved in getting many small mines to merge for greater efficiency and
expanded production, and the shortage of capital, we anticipate a steadier
growth in coal output. Even though an expansion of coal output from 5.8
million tons in 1962 to 9.0 million tons in 1966 would be a respectable achieve-
ment, the nearly 60 percent increase involved is substantially less than the
143 percent increase between 1957 and 1961 (when the absolute amounts were
smaller), and accounts for the over-all smaller freight growth anticipated.
Nevertheless, the proportion of coal in the total commercial revenue freight
will increase, accounting for about 55 percent by 1966.
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7L Without improvement of Korea's anthracite coal industry as the
major source of energy, the industrial development of the country cannot
proceed effectively. An analysis of energy demand prepared by the Government,
and generally approved by its foreign technical advisers, indicates an
increase in the effective demand for anthracite from about 5.4 million tons
to 11.9 million tons between 1960 and 1966; during that period anthracite's
share of energy will increase from 72 to 78 percent, excluding wood and straw,
which account for about one-half of the energy supply. In 1960, the total
energy consumed per person was only about 0.6 tons of anthracite equivalent.
The Government estimates that while the relative share of anthracite used
for civilian and Government purposes will decline in the coming years, the
proportion used by power plants and industry will more than double, - from
20 percent in 1960 to 44 percent by 1966. In terms of need, rather than
effective demand, an even further increase in coal output would be desirable
in order to replace wood as the major source of civilian heat energy; the
deforestation of Korea is accelerating the erosion of the land, which presents
one of the most serious problems to Korean agriculture. The lack of coal for
civilian purposes is also reflected, for example, in the failure to heat
schools and government offices adequately or at all.
72. Of the other major commodities carried by the railroad, cement is
expected to nearly double between 1961 and 1966, - from about 0.6 to 1.1
million tons. The increased domestic production will avoid the need for
imports, unless a hydro-electric plant is built; this, however, would involve
merely a one-time shipment. Fertilizer, now the second largest item, is not
expected to increase, with greater domestic production offset by lower imports,
and the expanding requirements met by better fertilizers not involving
increased quantities. Petroleum imports will continue to be kept down by
Government restrictions. As for iron ore, we have accepted the Government's
estimate of a modest increase from 420,000 tons to 520,000 between 1961 and
1966; it is, however, possible that the increase may be much more substantial.
73. The railroad Program, in addition to its important contribution to
the industrialization of Korea described above, will also permit major re-
ductions in costs. Largely because of the complete dieselization, it is
estimated that while passenger-kms and ton-kms will each increase by about
28 percent between 1962 and 1966, operating expenses will go up by only 7.5
percent. In the absence of those parts of the investment Program reducing
costs, operating expenditures in 1966 would be nearly H1w 15 billion higher.
As shown in Annex 1, the rate of return on the dieselization alone is more
than 30 percent. In addition, there will be substantial savings in foreign
exchange, e.g. US$1.7 million annually on fuels and lubrication.
E. The Project
74. The Project covers the most urgent part of the revised 1962-66
Railroad Investment Program and includes (a) procurement and manufacture of
rolling stock during 1962 and 1963, (b) completion of the Hwanji line in 1963,
and (c) the establishment of a modern accounting and statistical system. It
does not include other new line construction, improvement of railway facilities,
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and the contemplated dieselization during this period because any delay in
these items will not seriously affect the Project and because the necessary
foreign exchange is not yet assured.
75. The cost of the Project will be Hw 35.3 billion (US$27.2 million
equivalent), of which Hw 15.6 billion is in local currency and US$15.9 million
in foreign exchange. These amounts include 5 percent contingencies on foreign
exchange expenditures and 15 percent on local expenditures. The Project
accounts for about 27 percent of the foreign exchange cost of the whole Program
and 18 percent of the local expenditures.
76. Of the foreign currency cost of the Project, the IDA credit will
finance the procurement of 115 passenger cars, 800 coal cars, and US$100,000
for financial consultants:
1. Foreign Exchange
IDA US$1h.0 million equivalent
Korean Foreign Exchange US$21.9 "
Total US$15.9 million equivalent
2. Local Currency
Railroad Special Account Hw 13.6 billion
Government General Account HIw 2.0 "
Total HST 15.6 billion
77. The proposed List of Goods would be:
US$ million
115 passenger cars 6.0
800 coal cars 7.2
Financial consultants 0Ol
Contingencies 0.7
Total 14l0
78. Orders for all passenger cars and coal cars financed by IDA will
be placed in 1962 or early 1963 on the basis of international competitive
bidding. All procurement will be completed by the end of 1963.
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IV. COMCLUSIONS AND RECOPYIvENDATIONS
79. In spite of some organizational deficiencies, the management and
operation of the Railroad are satisfactory, and its financial position can
be made sound by rate and fare increases. Its 1962 - 1966 Investment
Program, scaled dowtm as herein recommended, is well planned and engineered,
and its implementation is of high priority for the economic development of
Korea. Suitable procurement methods would be employed. Accordingly, the
Project provides a suitable basis for a development credit of US$14.0
million eqaivalent to the Government of Korea.
80. During the negotiations the Government has agreed to a number of
conditions to help assure the Projectts economic and financial success.
The most important of these include:
i) The Government will r;view the Investment Program and before
making any investment on certain specified items, will inform
IDA and give it an opportunity to comment.
ii) The Government will appoint a chief executive officer respon-
sible for the day-to-day operations of the Railroad.
iii) The Government will establish before June 30, 1963, a separate
office in the Ministry of Transportation which will be respon-
sible only for the management and operation of the railroad.
Promptly after the establishment of the accounting system in-
cluded in the Project, the Government will make the Railroad
a separate agency.
iv) The Railroad will maintain separate accounts reflecting its
receipts and expenditures and capital transactions in accord-
ance with generally accepted commercial accounting principles.
v) The Government will employ competent consultants to assist in
establishing a modern accounting and statistical system.
vi) The Government will increase freight rates by June 1, 1963,
sufficiently to raise freight revenues by 25 per cent. In
addition, it will offset any increase in present wages or
prices of supplies and materials promptly by rate or fare
increases. Upon establishment of a sound accounting system,
it will set rates and fares at a level which will provide a
reasonable return on the investment in the Railroad.
vii) The Railroad will repay to the Government the proceeds of
the credit over 25 years at 5 3/4 per cent interest.
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Details of Dieselization Program
I. Utilization of Diesel Locomotives
The Railroad operates at present a standard gauge locomotive fleet
as follows:
N u m b e r
Average
Type Total hssigned in use
Diesel locomotives 1,750 hp 29 29
875 hp 52 52
850 hp shunter 14. 1A_
Total Diesels 9595
Steam locomotives Heavy 128 96
Medium 72 50
Light 40 27
Total Steam 240* 173
The Railroad plans to purchase the following diesel locomotives:
Type Number
1,850 hp 15
1,310 hp 25
875 hp 60
Total .100
The 875 hp diesel locomotives will replace light and medium steam
locomotives; the 1,310 hp ones will replace medium and heavy steam locomo-
tives, and the 1,850 hp locomotives will be used for heavy duty wherever the
Railroad's heaviest steam locomotives do not render satisfactory service.
This is mainly for heavy coal trains on the Central Line from Seoul to Yongju
and its extension to the port of Mukho, which has gradients up to 1:30. The
heavy diesel locomotives are and will continue to be used on the double track
main line Seoul-Pusan, which permits longer freight trains than on the single
track lines.
Based on a study of train movements to assure maximum utilization
of the diesels, the Railroad plans to use the 100 new diesel locomotives for
the following services:
* Plus 28 steam locomotives stored; total 268 serviceable steam locomotives
(See Table No. 2).
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Linking of Services for new Diesel Locomotives
(P = Passenger. F Freight. M = Mixed trains. SW = Switching Service)
Replacing
Number Steam Diesel
Type Required S e r v i c e locos a/ locos
1,310 hp 7 P. Seoul - Pusan 21 -
7 P. Seoul - Mokpo 10 3 (875 hp)
6 P. Seoul - Yongiu - Pusan - 6 (875 hp)
2 P. Iri - Yosu 3 -
3 M. Taejon - Songjongni 5 -
25 39 9
Released 7 P.& M. Taejon - Iri
875 hp Taejon - Seoul 20 -
2 P. Pusan - Taejon 6 -
9 26 -
New
875 hp 7 P.& M. Kyongju - Pusan 21 -
" Kyongju - Pohang
" Kyongju - Taegu
7 " Masan - Chinju 18
it Yasan - Pusan
3 " Seoul - Nungok-Uijongbu - -
3 SW. Taejon 3 -
12 SW. Seoul 23 -
5 P.& F. & SW - Iri 13 -
4 P.&-F. & SW - Mokpo 15 -
7 P.& F. & SW - Kwangju 14 -
7 P.& F. & SW - Sunchon 18 -
5 P.& SW.
Pukpyong - Cholam 28 -
60 153
1,850 hp 9 F. Seoul - Cholam-Mokpo 
- -
6 F. Seoul - Pusan 22 -
15 22
TCTAL 109 240 9
a! Figures include serviceable locomotives
which are in surplus.
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The 173 steam locomotives in use will be replaced by 100 diesel
locomotives, which is a normal proportion. The total number of 100 diesel
locomotives appears therefore to be justified. The total hauling capacity
of all locomotives available in 1961 compared with that in 1964, the first
year of complete dieselization, is as follows:
Train - km Engine - km Converted-car-km
Per service- Per service-
Total able engine Total able engine Total Per engine
(Million) (000) (million) (000) (million) (km)
- - - - - - - - -
Actual Results in 1961 - - - - - - - -
175 Steam 7.8 42.6 11.9 68.3 80.0 6.7
93 Diesel 11.1 119.2 14.0 150.6 178.1 12.7
Total 18.9 25.9 258.1
- - - - - - - - -
Capacity in 1964 - - - - - - - - - -
190 Diesel 22.7 119.2 28.6 150.6 363.0 12.7
Increase
Total 3.8 2.7 104.9
Increase
% 20.1 10.4 L4.6
a/ KNR shows in its statistics the number of bonverted
car kilometers" instead of "gross ton-kilometers
hauled". However, converted car-kilometers are in
direct proportion to the gross ton-kilometers hauled
and may therefore serve as a measure for all operat-
ing movements.
The table shows that the procurement of 100 diesel locomotives is
not only sufficient to replace the steam locomotives still in use, but would
also permit a 20% increase in train-kilometers and of 40% overall carrying
capacity. This corresponds to the estimated traffic increase in 1966.
The statements of the Railroad do not provide details of the further
use of the existing diesel locomotives, in particular of the 1,750 hp loco-
motives for heavy duty. Since the utilization study for the new locomotives is
rnot specific in showing the use of thu 1,850 hp locomotives, the final break-
down of the hundred locomotives by duty classes and types should be the subject
of a special study.
II. Cost Reductions from Dieselization
The Railroad has already experienced some of the economies of diesel
traction in comparison to steam. Diesel traction has proved much less expensivr
than steam traction even though coal is produced locally. Korean Anthracite,
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because of its small size, is suitable for locomotive use only after it has
been pressed into briquets with the additional imported coal tar pitch. One
hundred steam locomotives have been converted to oil burning.
In 1961 the Railroad's fuel and lubrication consumption was as
follows:
Local Import Total
Cost Cost Tax Cost
(hw-billion) ($ million) (hw-billion) ($million
equivalent)
I. Diesel Locomotives
Diesel Fuel
13.3 million gallons - 1.30 0.83 1.94
Lubrication Oil
243,000 gallons - 0.14 0-Q6l
Subtotal diesel - 1.44 0.83 2.08
II. Steam Locomotives
Fuel Oil
36.5 million gallons - 2.31 1.36 3.36
Briquets
285,000 tons 3.30 1.54 0.20 4.23
Lubrication and grease 0.11 0.07 0.16
Subtotal Steam 3..30 _ 1,63 7.75
Grand Total 3.30 5.40 2.46 9.83
In 1961, the diesel.locomotives rendered 14.0 million engine-kms,
and the steam locomotives 11.9 million engine-kis. Thus the average fuel
and lubrication cost for diesel locomotives was US$0.148 equivalent per engine.
km, less than one-fourth that of US$0.652 equivalent per engine-km for steam
locomotives.
If the remaining-steam locomotives would be replaced by 100ldiesel
locomotives, savings would be as follows:
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$ Equivalent
per year
I. Operating costs of existing
steam locomotives:
1. Fuel and lubrication 7,750,000
2. Maintenance and repair 660,000
3. Parts 200.000
Subtotal 8,610,000
4. Depreciation on residual
value LOO.000
Total Steam 9,010,000
II. Operating costs of 100
additional diesel locomotives:
1. Fuel and lubrication 2,250,000
2. Maintenance and repair 400,000
3. Parts 400,000
Subtotal 3,050,000
4. Depreciation (5%) 850 000
Total Diesel 3, 900,000
Savings:Diesel versus Steam $5,110,000
This makes no allowance for important additional savings from closing down
all facilities only needed for steam traction, such as steam running sheds,
water and coaling stations, etc. These cannot be estimated since the rail-
road does not have cost a.ccounbing. But even without them, the savings on
operating costs for tbe 100 new diesel locomotives bring a return of about
30 per cent on the 17 million dollar investment in diesels. The savings in
foreign exchange will also be substantial. For example, on fuel and lubrica-
tion the foreign exchange costs are estimated at US$3.96 million annually for
the existing steam locomotives, compared to only $2.25 million for the new
diesels.
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Passenger Car Requirements
The following table shows the Railroadts present passenger car
situation, anticipated retirements and additions, and the situation at the
end of the Program period:
Additions 1962-1966
Retire- Local
March ments Manu- Stock at End
Type 1962 1962-66 Imports facture Total of 1966
Regular Passenger-
carrying cars
2nd Class 70 302/ 4o 4 0 80
2nd & 3rd class
combined 26 5 - - - 21
3rd class 526 52 75 430/ 505 979
3rd class con-
verted box cars 231Y 231 - - -_
Sub-total Passenger-
carrying stock 853 318 115 430 545 1,080
Special carsi/ 81 1 - - - 80
Passenger, Baggage
& Mail combined 55)
)133 9 - - _ 124
Baggage & Mail )
cornbined 78)
Total Passenger
Stock 1,067 328 115 430 545 1,284
a/ 10 official, 40 sleeping, 14 dining, 1 first-class, and 16 hospital cars.
b/ Total of 463 cars counted only one-half because of lower capacity.
c/ To be down-graded to 3rd class.
d/ 400 cars manufactured locally plus 30 cars down-graded from 2nd class.
The 115 cars to be imported (40 second-class and 75 third-class cars)
are scheduled for procurement from the IDA credit in 1962-63. The table indi-
cates that the regular passenger carrying stock will increase during the
Program period by 227 cars, or 26% compared to an anticipated increase in
passenger traffic of 28%. However, to meet traffic demands and to alleviate
overcrowding of trains, the Railroad should plan to continue local manufacture
of passenger cars or further procurement after 1966.
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I. Coal Cars
The Railroad has 3,750 standard gauge Gondola cars suitable
for coal traffic. 384 of them are hopper cars, of which about 40 are
mainly for the Railroad's own ballast transport. The following table
shows the coal and other traffic on Gondola cars and their utilization
during the past three years:
1959 1960 1961
Coal Traffic
Comercial Traffic (000 tons) 3,54o 4,368 5,060
KNR (000 tons) 851 706 638
Total (000 tons) 4,391 5,074 5,698
Cars Loaded in Coal Traffic
Commercial traffic (000) 106 131 151
Average load commercial
traffic (tons) 33.4 33.4 33.8
MIR (000) 26 22 19
Average load KNR (tons) 32.4 32.1 32.6
Total cars loaded (000) 132 153 170
Average load total traffic(tons) 33.3 33.3 33.5
Total Gondola Cars Loaded
All traffic (000) 176 183 212
Gondola cars loaded other
than coal traffic (000) 44 30 42
it it (%) 25 16.4 19.8
Gondola cars available, annual average 2,790 2,960 3,184
Gondola cars in coal traffic, annual average2,090 2,470 2,560
Gondola cars in other traffic 700 490 624
Tons of coal per car and year 2,100 2,060 2,230
The revised traffic forecast (see paragraph 69) estimates an
increase of commercial coal traffic to 9 million tons in 1966. With the
forthcoming dieselization, KNR's departmental coal traffic will decrease
from 638,000 tons in 1961 to about 100,000 tons, which will still be
needed for purposes other than locomotive burning. The coal traffic may
thus be expected to develop as follows:
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Commercial traffic 5.8 6.6 7.4 8.2 9.0 9.8
KNR o.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Total .7 7.0 77 77 9.1 9-9
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Table No. 9 shows the coal car requirements for the years 1961-
1967. As in the past, it is assumed that 20 percent of the Gondola cars will
be used for traffic other than coal. This allows a certain increase of this
traffic too. Throughout the 1962-1966 Program period, except in 1964, the
existing stock will be unable to meet all demands of coal transport, so that
retirement of some obsolete stock should be postponed.
In 1963, 800 coal cars to be purchased from the IDA credit will be
put into operation, and local production will also start. In 1964 there will
be a small surplus in capacity which will be eliminated after 1964 by the
increase of coal traffic; unless local production of coal cars is increased to
a rate of 400 annually by 1966, there would be a serious deficit beginning in
that year.
The conclusions are: (1) immediate procurement of 800 coal cars is
necessary for service starting during 1963; (2) procurement of 200 additional
coal cars is needed in 1965; (3) local production of 800 coal cars during the
Program period is justified; and (4) further increases of local production of
coal cars are necessary beyond the Program period.
II. Box Cars
The Railroad owns at present 3,935 standard gauge box cars. In
addition, 463 box cars are being used temporarily as passenger cars, of which
400 will become available for freight traffic with the forthcoming procure-
ment and local manufacture of passenger cars; the remaining 63 are obsolete
and due for scrapping. The prospective situation for box cars during the
Program period is estimated as follows:
1962 1963 1964 1265 1966 1967
Number of cars
beginning of year 3,935 3,935 4,135 4,335 4,435 4,535
To be scrapped - 100 100 100 100 100
Balance 3,935 3,835 4,035 4,235 4,335 4,435
Nlanufacture - 100 100 200 200 300
Reconversion - 200 200 - - -
Balance at end
of year 3,935 4,135 4,335 4,435 4,535 4,735
Average number of
cars during year 3,935 4,035 4,235 4,385 4,485 4,635
Average annual
increase - 100 200 150 100 150
Percentage increase - 2.5 5.0 3.5 2.3 3.3
This modest increase in the box car stock compares fairly well with the annual
increase of 3 percent for traffic other than coal.
Annex 3
Page 3
III. Tentative Program for Local Manufacture of Freight Cars
The Railways' Program call for the local manufacture of 700 freight
cars annually beginning in 1963. As explained in paragraph 53, it would be
desirable to reduce this program along the following lines:
T o t a 1 1967
Type 1963 1964 1965 1966 1963-1966 and followingyears
minimum
Gondola 100 100 200 400 800 400
minimum
Box 100 100 200 200 600 300
a/
Other types 100 120 80 100 4000 100
Total 300 320 480 700 1,800 800
a/ Includes: 70 flat cars, 140 tank cars, 70 refrigerator cars and
120 cabooses.
The table shows that the Railroads' freight car manufacturing
program is generally justified after 1965. If it should prove impossible to
increase local freight car production to an annual rate of 700 by 1966,
additional imports of freight cars may become necessary in 1966 and thereafter.
KOREAN NATIONAL RAILROAD
Simmary of Selected Operatixr Statistics
19SS 1956 1957 1958 1960 1961
I. Traffic
1. Passenger-km ( a. i 1 1 i o n ) 3,712 4,049 3,435 4,172 4,540 4,935 5,371
2. Net Ton-In (m i 1 1 i o n ) 2,060 2,274 2,570 2,658 3,071 3,282 3,488
3. Traffic-Unite ( i 1 1 i o n ) 5,772 6,323 6,005 6,830 7,611 8,217 8,859
Traffic-Units ton-km passenger-km.
II. Operation
1. Train-km S t e am ( O0D) 13,375 14,688 13,780 9,412 8,766 7,529 7,800
Train-km D i s e 1 (000) 282 332 1,988 5,858 7,794 10,560 11,100
Train-km R a i 1 c ar (000) 150 349 411 533 645 696 1,000
Train-km T o t a 1 (000) 18,807 15,369 16,179 15,803 17,225 18,785 19,900
2. Engine-km S t e a ( OS) 22,561 21,554 2D,701 15,174 13,384 U1,588 11,900
Engine-km D i e e 1 (000) 521 431 2,301 6,941 9,737 12,898 14,000
Railcar-km (O0) 150 368 447 585 719 762 1,100 Remark
Respective Data per Engine available:
3. Number of Engines in fleet 1960 1961
Steam 522 523 516 479 458 457 350 251 215
Diesel 4 4 3 47 69 95 95 92 92
Railcars 10 12 14 14 14 10 16 9 15
Total motive poaer units 536 539 564 540 541 562 461 352 322
4. Engine-km per Engim-Day in fleet
Steas 118 113 110 91 80 70 94 127 160
Diesel 357 295 186 406 387 373 402 381 411
Railcar 41 61 87 114 140 210 220 233 251
5. Traffic-units per motiw power-unit in fleet ( m i 1 1 i o n ) 10.8 11.7 10.7 12.7 14.1 14.6 19.2 23.4 Z7,3
6. Traffic unite per train-km 307 412 373 432 442 437 446
7. Passerger-km per passernger-car in fleet ( m i 1 1 i o n ) 4.6 4.4 3.6 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.9
8. Passenger-km per passenger-car-kal/ 61.8 60.2 48.1 49.3 49.3 47.6 48.9
9. Net ton-km per freight car in fleet ( 000 ) 174 199 247 273 319 350 370
10. Available freight car days 3,0.96 2,754 2,500 2,420 2,373 2,255 2,480
11. Freight care loaded ( 000 ) 363 382 419 430 477 496 536
12. Average ture-around time of freight cars, days 8.5 7.2 6.0 5.6 5.5 4.6 4.6
13. Average load of freight cars, tone 28.6 28.9 28.7 28.1 28.8 29.1 28.1
III. Staff
1. Number of employees n.a. 31,092 29,297 27,234 26,798 26, 845 26,316
2. Traffic-Units per employee ( 000 ) 203 205 247 284 306 298
a/ Convrted box cars counted only one-half.
KCRUAN NATIONAL RAILROAD
RAILIAY PROJBCT
Staterment or Motive Power and Rollirn Stock (March 1962)
Under or Available stock R e m a r kTo be Service- awaitirg Available in percent of Available butTotal scrapped able repair for use serviceable stock not in use
I. Locosotives
Steam Standard G Coal burning 238 70 168 58 110 32Oil bumirg 100 
- 100 1 97Subtotal Standard G 338 70 268 61 207 32Narrow G Coal burnirg 12 1 11 3 8 2
Total Steam Locomotives 350 n 279 64 21S 77 34
Die selele ctric
Standard G 1,750 hp 29 - 29 1 28875 hp 52 
_ 52 2 50850 hp shunters 14 14 14
Total Dieselelectrlc Looomotives 95 
-91 92 97
II. Diesel Railcars
Standard Gauge 29 
- 29 
- 29 100
Narrow Gauge 3 1 2 
- 2 100
III.Passenger Cars
Standard Gauge, lat Class and Special 81 2 79 8 71
n 2nd Class & 2nd &3d Class 96 4 92 4 88
n 3rd Class 526 17 509 21 488Baggage and Mail 133 6 1Z7 10 1173rd Class converted Box Cars 463 463 3 460
Subtotal Standard Gauge 1,299 29 1,270 46 1,224 97
Narrow Gauge , 3rd Class 9 9 _ 2 7 78
Total Passenger Cars 108 29 2 1.231 96
IV. Freigit Cars
Standard Gauge, Box Car 3,935 19 3,916 233 3,683
Gondola and Hopper 3,750 4 3,746 101 3,645Flat 918 4 914 76 838Tank 545 
- 545 3 542Refrigerator 158 5 153 25 128Caboose 208 2 206 48 158
Subtotal 9.514 9.480 486 8.994 95
Narrow Gauge. Bax Car 110 
- 110 1 109
Gondola 96 96 3 93
Subtotal 206 
- 206 4 202 98
Total Freight Cars 9,720 34 9,686 490 9,196 95
tJ To be reconverted into box cars: 400
To be scrapped
, 
KOREAN NATIONAL RAILROAD
Freight Traffic, 1955 - 1966
(millions of tons)
A c t u a l E s t i m a t e
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Revenue Freight
Commercial Freight
Coal 1.3 1.5 2.1 2.4 3.5 4.4 5.1 5.8 6.6 7.4 8.2 9.0
Fertilizer 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 o.8 0.8 0.8
Cement O.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 o.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.1
Rice 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4- 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
Ore* :.a.* n.a. n.aG n.a, n.a. n.a. 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Timber 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Petroleum 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0°3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
Other 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.4
Sub-total 5.0 5.6 7.0 7.3 9.0 10.2 11.1 12.0 13.1 14.1 15.1 16.3
1Miilitary Freight 4.0 400 3.7 3.4 3.2 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
Sub-total, Revenue Freight 9.0 9.6 10.7 10.7 12.2 13.0 14.0 14.8 15.9 16.9 17.9 19.1
Railroad Service Freiaht 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2
Grand Total 10.4 :m1. 12.0 12.1 13.7 14.4 15.4 16.2 17.3 184. 19.1 20.3
* For 1955 - 1960 included under "Other". H
KOREAN NATIONAL RAILROAD
Passenger Traffic, 1957-1966
Millions of Passengers Average
1st and Billions of Passenger-km
Year 3rd Class 2nd Class Students Commuters Military Total Passenger-kms per Passenger
1955 32.6 0.5 19.0 1.0 4.2 57.3 3.7 64.8
1956 39.8 0.7 20.7 1.5 3.6 66.3 4.0 61.1
1957 29.2 0.7 18.3 1.3 3.9 53.4 3.4 64.2
Actual 1958 43.6 1.2 19.4 2.4 3.6 70.1 4.2 59.5
1959 49.1 1.4 16.3 1.3 3.4 71.5 4.5 63.5
1960 54.2 1.5 15.9 0.9 3.2 75.7 4.9 65.2
1961* 63.7 1.5 19.4 1.7 2.0 88.3 5.4 61.2
1962 96.0 6.o 63.0
1963 102.0 6.4 63.0
Estimne 19 64 109.0 6.9 63.0
1965 116.0 7.3 63.0
1966 123.0 7.7 63.0
* The 1961 total is actual, but the composition is estimated
Table No. 5
KOREAN NATIONAL RAILROAD
Balance Sheet, December 31, 1961
(billions of H-Iwan)
Assets
Current Assets
Cash - Deposits 2.3
Bonds 0.9
Receivables 1.7
Materials and Supplies 13.6
Sub-total 18.5
Net Fixed Assets
Land 27.3
Buildings 22.9
Way - Structure 3h6.5
Facility for Communication and
Electric Power 24.2
Machinery 10.8
Rolling Stock 135.3
Tools - Equipment 3.4
Sub-total 570.4
Total Assets 588.8
Liabilities
Current Liabilities
Accounts Payable 0.1
Accrued Income -
Accrued Taxes 1.2
Contract Performance Bonds 0.8
Sub-total 2.1
Debt (Bank of Korea) h. 8
Capital (Government equity) 581.9
Total Liabilities 588.8
1961 Balance Sheet Ratios
1. Current Ratio 8.8
2. Liquidity Ratio 2.3
3. Debt-Equity Ratio o.oo8
4. Liabilities (excl. Capital)
Total Assets 0.012
KOREAN NATIONAL RAILROAD
Comparative Statement of Income and Profit, 1957-66
(Billions of Hwan)
A c t u a 1 E s t i m a t e
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Operating Revenues
Passenger 19.4 23.1 25.8 27.7 31.9 38.1 40.5 43.4 46.0 48.6
Freight ' 6.6 12.5 14.2 14.9 24.1 29.1 33.0 34.7 36.5 Y,.'8
All Other 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.7 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
Total 26.5 36.1 40.7 44.3 57.3 68.2 74.6 79.3 83.8 88.8
Operating Expenses
Before deprec iation 24.0 33.2 34.2 39.2 50.0 62.0 63.9 62.0 61.5 64.2
Depreciatio @ 3.8 5.2 5.8 6.3 8.2 9.7 10.7 11.3 12.0 12.7
Total 27.8 38.4 40.0 45.5 58.2 71.7 74.6 73.3 73.5 76.9
Net Operating Revenues (or Loss) (1.3) (2.3) 0.7 (1.2) (0.9) (3.5) 0.0 6.0 10.3 11.9
Other Income 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Gross Income (or Loss) (1.2) (2.2) 0.8 (1.1) 1.5 (3.2) 0.3 6.3 10.6 12.2
Fixed C1-aarges (Interest, see Table 11) - - 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 3.5 3.2 3.0
Net Incc,ne (or Loss) (1.2) (2.2) 0.7 (1.3) 1.4 (3.3) (0.7) 2.8 7.4 9.2
Operating: Ratio (%) 105 106 98 103 102 105 100 93 88 86
1J Takes into account 25 percent increase in freight rates, June 1, 1962
/ Makes allowance for wage and other cost increases in 1962.
/ Calcul..ated at one-seventh of gross operating revenues.
K05E") N-TIONAL 40A10,O4D
The.oenet ala PInhest2en966
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 Total.
Foreig. toa Total Fore.. onaL Total Foreign onl loal Fornim. tonl Tota1 Foreig Lnal. Total. Foreign tonal. Total
= hao C 0r-ny Hea In=hane Corooy Ra- Eoh-ne- Cooreny Roan Echasg. Correcy H-o E-nha-ge C-reny Roan Enohale Correny Roan Pr90Peed n
I t e H- P~uv EqauPoi. $ qi Hoa _ q $ E400. Roan Eq1 $ Evoj. H-a Flomb. $ bumi. Roan Rai. $ ROl. Roa Eoolv for finanotgnC)
New Line Co-terntion
1. Roangj). Line, 16.-0 Ge (TmnKi-simpor
and Reagji - Pa.knani) 0.30 3.60R) 3,990 - - - - - - - - - -- 0.30 3.600 3,990 KFX and hallway Speoia1 A.oowt
2. ltYungbnk Line, 58.6 k. (YungJu-Q,oho-h) 0.70 2.3CR) 3,210 0.70 2,300 3.210 0.60 2,300 3.080 - - -- -- 2.00 6.900 9,500 ' Genra Acoont
3. Nangeu Line, 5.4 ke (banong-Uijoegbe) O.04n 80 132 0.03 60 99 0.03 60 99 - - -- -0.10 200 330 ' "Railway Spcnia1 oa- ct
4. Ch-ogea Line, 42.0 k. (Hanb..ek-ChW*Bea) 0.60 3,150 3,930 0.60 3,1.50 3,930 0.60 3.100 3,880 - -- -- 1.90 9.400 321,740 Geneal Acoont
5. Teeghan PokIn Line. 92.9 ke (Okk..-
Kangn-g-_Sokch.) 0.50 2.200 3,140 0.70 2.100 3.010 0.70 2.100 3.010 - - - - -- 2.20 6,300 9.160 Okkae-Kangnan S9peoia1 Acont
Roa 1.9 biUllo, liang-og-
S2k.h40 .enr.. IAcowat
6.Kyungjan Line, 50.5 ke (Ch4injo.2o-h4) - - - - - - 0.50 3.5O,2 .50 3.860 4,900 0.50 3,860 4,900 2.40 U1.600 14,720 
S.o4t.tal: 4W~ Line Constrotlon 2.44 21.230 14,402 2.03 7,610 10,249 2.73 21,440 14,989 0.50 3,560 4.900 0.90 3.96 4.900 8.50 38.000 49,440
El-otrifi-oton and Doable T .. kino
7. Ky.ngin Line, 38.9 Ion (se..ol-in-ho) - - - 2.00 1,150 3,750 1.90 1,250 3.620 l..90 1.150 3.620 1.90 1.150 3.620 7.70 4.600 14.610 KFX and Specia1 A-not
Motive Powr and Rollip, Stock
5. Plronremht of 100 diel ... eo1trin 1-onoti-e 12.00 70. 15.670 5.00 30 6.530 - - -- - - - - 17.00 l.00 22,200 AID and Spoa.1 Anroot
9. Prom'naa-t of 145 dienel railcar - - - 2.35 25 3.0O0 2.35 25 3,050 2.35 25 3,050 2.35 25 3,050 9.40 100 12.320 Undecided
10. Frocueent of 85 paeeeeger oare 3.50 - 4,550 1.50 - .1,950 - - - - - . - -5.00 - 6,500 lIFX
21. Procor-et of 100 Paeenger care- 2.50 - 3.250 2.50 - 3,250 - - - - - -- - -5.00 - 6.500 lIDA
12. Pronuemet of 500 coal hopper ear 2.25 - 2.925 2.25 - 2,925 - - - - - -- - -4.50 - 5,550 Germa toan
13. Procement of 555 coal hopper -a 2.50 - 3.250 2.50 - 3.250 - - - --- - -5.00 - 6.500 IDA
14. tonal produetio of 400 p.... ger nare 0.30 3,360 3,750 0.30 3.360 3,750 0.30 3,360 3,750 0.30 3,360 3,750 0.30 3,360 3,750 1.50 16.800 15,750 KFX and pecial Ac-oot
15. tonal prodoctice of 2.800 freight cae- - - 1.40 4,5oo 6.320o 1.40 4,500) 6.320 1.40 4.500 6.320 1.40 - 4,500 6.320 5.60 18.000 25.280 Gen Ia
in. Converin of 500 woden frelght car to tccl
bodice and rebil.]ding of 325 car - 650 650 - 650 650 - - - - - - - - - - 1.300 1. 300 Special A-oot
Subtotal:M.tl,e Poner & Rolling Stock 23.05 4.080 34,045 17.50 8.56.5 31,705 4.05 7.885 13.150 4.0.5 7.585 13,150 4.05 7.585 13,150 53.00 36.300 105,200
mner- est of Rillca Faoilitiee
17. Improemnt of wrkmhope to permt anolcoo-
etrontie of.100 pacoengr and 700 freight car 1.04 200 1.552 1.05 200 1,552 1.04 200 1.552 1.04 200 1.552 1.04 200 1.552 5.20 1,001 7.760 IP and/or Loa & Special A.tcot
18. Emtmneio of trade within yard., or majoriel
trial lion., renfornem-nt of track and ia,
proemet of eafoty facilities 0.20 500 1,060 0.20 800 1,060 0.20 500 1.560 - o .60, 2,400 3.180 IPX and Speial Aocant
19. 2.mt1ltiato and improeet of marhalling yarde - - 0.15 630 864 0.18 630 864 0.17 620 841 0.27 620 841 0.70 2.500 ).410 
20. Eateneimn of enloading facilitiem at thc port
of Mkokc 0.10 20 150 - - - - - -- - -- - -0.iC- 20 150
21. Improvm t of powor .-ne.nctle and eignal
fanilitiem 2.04 520 572 0.04 520 572 0.04 520 572 0.04 520 572 0.04 520 572 0.20 2,600 2.860
22. Improvemet of Scow Stati.n - - 0. 05 675 740 0.05 675 740 0.05 675 740 0.05 675 740 0.20 2,700 2.960
23. Pronreet of 1,800,OD0 preetreced -ort.,
tie. and of 7.00 pre.treceed c-crte pole 0.84 4.100, 5,192 0.54 4,100 5,192 0.84 4.100 5,192 0,84 4,100 5,9 0.84 4,10 5,192 4.20 20,500 2,96 IF ad/cr Lo- Special Accnot
SobtotalUo.promet of Ry.Facilitiee 2.22 5.640 8,526 2.35 6,925 9,980 2.35 6,925 9,980 2,14 6.115 8,897 2.14 6.115 8,8917 21.20 31.720 46.280
SOiggOY
1-6 Subtotal New Line Conetrutico 2.44 U.230 14,400 2.03 7.610 10,249 2.73 21.440 14.989 0.50 3.860 4.900 0.50 3,860 4, 900 8.50 38,000 49.440
7 Electrification mo DobIle Tracking - - -. 2,00 1.150 3,750 1.90 1.150 3.620 1.90 1,150 3,620 1.90 1,150 3,620 7.70 4.600 14.610
8-16 Motive Powe & Rolling Stock 23.05 4.080 34.045 17.50 8,565 31.705 4,05 7,585 13,150 4.05 7,885 13,150 4.05 7.885 13,150 53.00 36,300 105,200
17-23 ImPro-emet of RailwaY Pacilitiee 2.22 5,640 8.526 2.35 6.925 9,980 2.35 6.925 9,980 2.14 6.1215 5,897 2.14 6,215 8,897 11.20 31,720 46.280
GRAND4 TOTAL. 27.71 20,950 56,973 24.18 24.250 55,684 U1.03 27,400 41,739 8.89 19,020 30,567, 8.99 19.010 31.567 80.70 2.10,620 215.530
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Table 9
KOREAN NATIONAL RAILROAD
Coal Car Requirements 1961 - 1967
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Gondola cars at beginning of year n.a. 3,746 3,746 4,546 4,546 4,846 5,126
To be scrapped during year n.a. - 100 100 100 120 150
Balance 3,746 3,646 4,446 4,446 4,726 4,976
Additions during year:
Imports - 800 - 200 - -
Local production - - 100 100 200 400 400
Balance end of year 3,746 3,746 4,546 4,546 4,846 5,126 5,376
Average fleet during year 3,643 3,746 4,146 4,546 4,696 4,986 5,251
Less 5% under or awaiting repair 459 187 207 227 235 249 263
Average number of cars
available 3,184 3,559 3,939 4,319 4,461 4,737 4,988
Less 20/ for cars carrying traffic other
than coal 624 712 788 864 892 957 998
Average number of cars
available for coal traffic 2,560 2,847 3,151 3,455 3,569 3,780 3,990
Average carrying capacity, tons per car
and year 2,220 2,20C 2,200 2,200 2,300 2,400 2,400
Total carrying capacity of coal car stock
(000 tons) 5,698 6,270 6,932 7,601 8,209 9,072 9,576
Estimated coal transport (000 tons) 6,400 7,000 7,500 8,300 9,100 9,900
Surplus (deficit) (000 tons) (130) (68) 101 (91) (28) (324)
a/ 1961 actual, 1962-1967 estimate.
KOREAN NATIONAL RAILRCAD
Source and Use of Funds for Revised 1962-1966 Program
(Billions of Hwan)
Entire Period
1962 1963 1964 1965 11965 1962 - 1966
Source of Funds
Beginning of Period
Current assets (excluding stores) 4.9
Current liabilities 2.1
Subtotal, Working Capital 2.8 2.8 3.2 5.6 3 2.8
Funds now foreseeable
Net Income (or Loss) (see Table 6) (3.3 (0.7) 2.8 7.4 9.2 15.4
Depreciation 9.7 10.7 11.3 12.0 12.7 56.4
General Account (see Table 12) 8.0 15.4 13.9 5.5 8.0 50.7
Loans under consideration
IDA 5.0 13.2 - - - 18.2
AID 22.1- - 22.1
Subtotal 19.4 60.7 28.0 24.9 29.9 162.8
Additional funds required 10.
Loans 16.0 4.0 - - - 20
Increase in freight rates, June 1, 1963 4.5 8.5 9.0 9.5 31.5
Subtotal 16.0 8.5 8.5 9.0 9.5 51.5
Total sources of funds 38.2 72.0 39.8 39.5 43.1 217.1
Use of Funds H
Revised Investment Program 35.4 66.9 29.5 31.2 30.9 194.0
Repayment of BOK loan 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.4 C0
Repayment of loans under consideration 2.2
IDA - - 0.7 0.7 0.7 2.2 H
AID -- 1.5 1.5 1.5 4.4L o
Repayment of additional loans required - 1.6 2.0 2.0 2 0 7± o
Total funds required 35.8 68.8 34.0 35.7 35.4 2o9.6
Working Capital End of Period 2.0 3.2 5.6 3.7 7.5 7.5
Table No. 11
KOREAN NATIOThL RAILROAD
Cash Generation and Debt Service Cover, 1962-66
(Millions of Hwan)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Net Operating Revenue (3.5) 0.0 6.o 10.3 11.9
Depreciation 9.7 10.7 11.3 12.0 12.7
Other Income 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Cash generated by KNR 6.5 11.0 17.6 22.6 24.9
Interest
On present debt 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
On proposed loans:
IDA - - 1.0 1.0 1.0
AID - - 1.3 1.2 1.1
On additional loans required - 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.8
Total interest 0.1 1.0 3.5 3.2 3.0
Amortization
Present debt o.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Proposed Xoans:
IDA1/ _ - 0.7 0.7 0.7
AI U - - 1.5 1.5 1.5
Additional loans requiredi! - 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.0
Total amortization 0.4 2.9 4.5 4.5 4.5
Total debt service 0.5 2.9 8.0 7.7 7.5
Times interest earned - 35.0 - 1.7 3.2 4.0
Debt Service Ration 13.0 3.8 2.2 2.9 3.3
Assumptions:
1/ Loan of Hw 18.2 billion, 25 years, 5 3/4 per cent interest.
2/ Loan of Hw 22.1 billion, 15 years, 5 3/4 per cent interest.
3/ Loans of Hw 16.0 billion in 1962 and of
Hw 4.0 billion in 1963, each at 10 years, 5 3/4 per cent interest
KOREAN NATIONAL RAILROAD
Proposed Financing from General Account of
Revised Investment Proarnm 1962-1966
(Billions of Wkan)
Entire Period1962 1963 196 1965 1966 1962 - 1966Foreign Local For. Local For. Local For. Local For. Local For. LocalExchanze Currency Total Exch, Cur. Total Exch, Cur. Total Exch. Cur, Total Exch. Cur. Total Exch. Cur, Total
Tonghae Pukbu Line - - - 1.2 2.6 3.8 0.8 1.8 2.6 _ _ _ _ 2.0 4.4 6.4
Chungsun Line 0.8 3.1 3.9 0.8 3.1 3.9 0.7 3.1 3.9 - _ _ _ _ _ 2.3 9.4 11.7
Kyungbuk Line 0.9 2.3 3.2 0.9 2.3 3.2 0.8 2.3 3.1 2 - _ _ _ _ .6 6.9 9.5
Construction of
1,800 freight cars - - - 0.8 2.0 2.8 0.8 2.0 2.8 1.3 3.3 4.6 1.8 4.7 6.5 4.7 12.0 16.7
Sub-total 1.7 5.4 7.1 3.7 10.0 13.7 3,1 9.2 12.4 1.3 3.3 4.6 1.8 4.7 6.5 11.6 32.7 44.3
Contingencies* 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.2 1.5 1.7 0,2 1.4 1.5 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.2 1.2 1.5 0.7 5.6 6.3
Total 1.8 6.2 8.0 3.9 11.5 15.4 3.3 10.6 13.9 1.4 4.1 5.5 2.0 5.9 8.0 12.3 38.4A 507-
* 5% for foreign exchangp costs and 15% for local currency costs in
1962-4, 10% ard 25% respectively in 1965-6.
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